Wednesday, December 15, 2010
The link is to the default map, which is a view of greater New York City broken down by racial and ethnic groups, but you can zoom out and scroll over to any other part of the country, and click on the "View More Maps" button to see the other mapping options.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
The most famous campaign to reduce the profitability of the mineral extraction industry in conflict zones is of course the one on conflict diamonds, which over time became visible enough to be referenced in several hit movies (including Blood Diamond, with Leonardo DiCaprio, and the James Bond installment Die Another Day) — a sign of high public awareness, if not always knowledge :-).
Unfortunately, the minerals that help fund the conflict in Eastern Congo are less photogenic as well as harder to track than diamonds. Gold, tin, tantalum, tungsten, coltan — all can be melted or ground down, so that physical tracking becomes impossible. The only way to track them, then, is to have a completely transparent supply chain which accounts for every gram of gold, tin, etc. that corporations use.
The Enough project's report is a first attempt to investigate how well corporations are doing in moving towards such transparency and accountability. The report ranks major technology companies on "percentage of progress toward responsible sourcing on conflict minerals". The top performer is HP, at just 32%, followed by Intel, at 24%. Worst on their list are SanDisk and Toshiba.
Although the blog post gives the key take-away findings, the report is worth reading for its discussion of the many challenges associated with achieving "progress toward responsible sourcing". (The report is not very clear, unfortunately, on the ranking methodology, but more detailed rankings can be downloaded from the Enough website here.)
The motivation for the research was that it is well-known that the United States as a whole performs poorly on such international comparisons (for the latest example, see here), but the United States is so large that it might well be the case that individual states within the U.S. outperform most countries. The researchers' finding, unfortunately for the U.S., is that the best performing state, Massachusetts, comes in 17th, followed by Minnesota in 20th place, with no other state in the top 25.
The study is interesting (and disturbing) in its own right, but it is also a nice example of bringing good social science methods to bear on questions that many people have impressionistic beliefs about but which are often difficult to test systematically. [As Hanushek notes in Ripley's article, one explanation for poor U.S. performance he often hears in his hometown of Palo Alto is "We're a very heterogeneous society — all these immigrants are dragging us down. But our kids are doing fine.")]
Here's the claim: seat 666 at the European Parliament is empty, waiting to be filled by the Antichrist (666 being the number of the beast). One source of this notion is Ian Paisley, the radical anti-Catholic Ulster politician, in an article dating to 1999. (Interestingly, 11 years earlier Paisley had denounced Pope John Paul II as the Antichrist when the latter addressed the European Parliament in its previous building). Other sources are here and here.
The allegedly incriminating list of seat allocations (with an empty spot at 666) dates to 1999, when seat 666 may indeed have been unallocated. So, however, were quite a number of other seats: the European Parliament in 1999 had 626 members, but occupied a debating chamber with seats for 750 (since expanded to 785) legislators (its previous home had seats for 600 delegates, so no number 666 there). This means that 750-626 = 124 seats were unoccupied, about 1 in 6.
The claim that the number of one particular unallocated seat is anything other than coincidental is of course idiotic. But it continues to survive, even though the actual seat has been occupied for years now (first, apparently, by Sajjad Karim, a British Liberal, who when asked about the significance of his seat number in 2006 was completely flummoxed :-). Current seating plans for the Strasbourg and Brussels hemicycles can be found here.
Still, a search on the terms "european parliament", "seat", and "666" yields about 108,000 results according to Google, and plenty of websites confidently assert that the seat has never been filled. (On the other hand, the European Parliament is just one part of the EU — a search on "European Union" and "antichrist" gives about 841,000 results!)
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Given the obvious promise and appeal of using Google Maps for such purposes, one wonders whether Google is working towards incorporating a similar set-up as one of Google's own products (of which they have more and more). It is probably not a coincidence that they're already a partner of Ushahidi, the non-profit interactive mapping initiative I mentioned last month.
As the linked article notes, Columbia's administration quickly reversed itself on this issue, fortunately. Nonetheless, the episode reminded me of Solzhenitsyn's First Circle, in which Soviet scientists must lock away their top-secret research documents in a safe every night, so the imperialist spies won't be able to steal them — except this top-secret research consists mainly of Western science journals, since Western science is far ahead of the Soviets. (It's been years since I read Solzhenitsyn, so apologies for a somewhat hazy description)
It is similarly absurd to pretend that the material leaked by Wikileaks is still in some way secret or confidential. Fortunately for Columbia students, their administration is a little less delusional than the Soviet regime was; still, their instinctual reaction is telling.
The blog posting links to the actual research paper, as well as some other related links. Comments on the posting note that it is likely to be much more difficult to find political support for such an intervention than it is for foreign aid. Moreover, keeping the overstay rate low requires active involvement and monitoring on the part of the home as well as the host country. The United States currently has a seasonal worker visa program (H2A), but it is not clear how much monitoring takes place — I was unable to even find estimates of overstay rates, for example (but plenty of law offices willing to advise those who have overstayed on what to do next :-).
Sunday, December 5, 2010
For example, surveys consistently find that while a majority of Americans would like to see the U.S. aid budget cut, a majority of Americans also wants the U.S. to give much more aid than it does. This apparent contradiction arises from the fact that most Americans believe the U.S. gives far more aid than it does.
The pattern has been familiar since 1995, when the Program on International Policy Attitudes found that the median estimate of the U.S. aid budget was 15% of the total federal budget, at a time when the actual outlay was a little under 1%. The median preferred share of the federal budget to be allocated to aid was 5% (i.e. on average 1/3 of what people thought was the current level but 5 times the actual current level).
A follow-up study in 2001 found "no decline in the public's extreme overestimation of the amount of the federal budget that goes to foreign aid." Indeed, in this second study the median estimate was that 20% of the federal budget went to aid, while the median desired allocation was 10% of the budget. Meanwhile, the actual aid budget had not changed much and continued to be just under 1%.
(The follow-up study also noted that in a different survey, 66% of respondents said that t00-high foreign spending was a "major reason the economy is not doing better than it is.")
Little has changed in the past decade, as poll results just published by World Public Opinion.org show. Indeed, the overestimation of U.S. aid continues to increase: now the median estimate of the share of the federal budget that goes to foreign aid is 27%, with the median desired allocation still at 10% (actual aid volume continues to be close to 1% of the federal budget).
The survey also found that the lower one's education attainment, the higher the median estimate of aid's share of the budget — "Among those with less than a high school education the median estimate was that foreign aid represented an extraordinary 45 percent." This may help account for the erroneous belief in some circles that it should be fairly easy to cut the federal budget in difficult economic times such as these. In practice, of course, even a complete elimination of the foreign aid program (something few people advocate) would have only a small impact on the deficit.
Saturday, December 4, 2010
Very funny Mad Lib satirizing ICT4D arguments (see earlier post here).
Egypt has a second round of elections this weekend (the first round was last week). Good article by Gwynne Dyer on "Why elections are a charade in Egypt under Hosni Mubarak", and some background by Eric Trager on "Egypt's Machiavellian electoral gambit" (from just before the first round).
Critical article by Marlise Simons in the NYT a week or two back about problems the International Criminal Court has encountered in pursuing its first trial, that of Thomas Lubanga, who stands accused of committing various war crimes, including the conscription of child soldiers.
Funny article in the NYT by David Segal about how there is no such thing as bad publicity on the web for ecommerce businesses.
Just notes that "the ability to ignore human rights, to regard mass killing coldly and cynically, is not the province of any one political party or even any one ideology," a conclusion that echoes Samantha Power's argument in her devastating A Problem from Hell. He also points out that, in the end, preventing genocide was not particularly costly, either in economic terms or in political (good-)will. But it does require that the regime sponsoring a (potential) genocide be vulnerable, as Indonesia was in the late 1990s.
The obvious question is whether the Sudanese government is similarly vulnerable, should things get out of control in Southern Sudan after the scheduled referendum on independence a few months from now. Richard Just thinks not, and I am inclined to agree. But that does not mean genocide cannot be prevented; only that it requires a stronger commitment (and some advance preparation, for example in terms of lobbying at the UN) on the part of those who would do so. An opportunity, perhaps, for the Obama administration to improve its standing on human rights? Hope springs eternal!
If the administration of the drug did not arise from incompetence, the report suggests that not only would this policy "likely satisfy the legal definition of torture" (p. 4), but also, if used as part of a program of enhanced interrogation, "would be the psychological equivalent of waterboarding."
TruthOut.org has a parallel article on the issue, which quotes Remington Nevin, a Major in the U.S. Army Medical Corps as calling the policy "pharmacological waterboarding." Nevin has been doing a lot of research on the adverse effects of mefloquine, so he knows of what he speaks.
I buy the argument that, if deliberately administered for non-medical reasons, the policy can be characterized as torture. But there are many types of torture, and I am not convinced that waterboarding is the physical "instrument" whose effects are most similar to this medical "instrument". One sort of suspects that both Nevin and Seton Hall latched onto the comparison because of the resonance of the term waterboarding in the public discourse.
Either way, this is rather disturbing news, and it is important to get some answers about the motivations for the administration of mefloquine. Of course, given the Obama administration's reluctance to pursue such answers in other torture-related areas, there is little reason for optimism.
P.S. Interesting discussion of the Army dispensing mefloquine to its own soldiers in the Army Times here. Given the available evidence at this point, I'd put the odds of incompetence vs. torture at about 50-50.
Thursday, December 2, 2010
A number of prominent academics and participants in various ICT4D initiatives offer their responses. Archon Fung's argument about the possibility of exploiting the socio-economic biases of technology is particularly intriguing. The final contribution in the forum is Toyama's, who responds to the comments from the other contributors. Toyama is not optimistic about Fung's suggestion that technology be specifically designed to help improve the lives of the poor, but thinks he may be on to something in suggesting that technology be used to support public goods.
I think Toyama is right in pointing out that "inevitably, the rich, skilled, and socially connected will make better use of [technologies] than the rest." But this need not be as big a problem as he seems to believe it is. Fung's argument, I believe, is that one can develop specific technologies that the rich, skilled, and socially connected would not have a strong incentive to use, because the technologies supply something (possibly a public good, but not necessarily so) that they do not need (either because they already have it, or simply because it is not one of their needs).
The challenge, of course, is that this requires a lot more thought than simply throwing laptops or cellphones at a developing country problem. But promoting such an approach would be a good complement, I believe, to Toyama's central prescription: that, "when deciding how to allocate resources between technology and human capital, [we] invest first in the factor that is most lacking," which, in a developing country, will often be the latter.
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
Given the high likelihood that Ireland will need to return to the negotiating table for some new solution, concerns about the handling of potential similar problems in other eurozone states are mounting. Willem Buiter, Chief Economist at Citigroup, has a good economic overview of the problems facing European sovereign debtors in particular: Sovereign Debt Crisis Update. Figure 34 in this article is particularly interesting (or worrisome).
Key points from Buiter's conclusion: "There is no such thing as an absolutely safe sovereign," "the distinction between public and private balance sheets can become blurred in a crisis." Not grounds for great optimism, in other words.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
For example, the article quotes without comment a spokesperson for the Sons of Confederate Veterans who says "We're celebrating that those 170 people [who signed South Carolina's ordinance of secession on Dec. 20, 1860] risked their lives and fortunes to stand for what they believed in, which is self-government."
However, all it takes is one quick glance at South Carolina's "Declaration of the Immediate Causes", which explained secession, to realize that what they believed in was slavery, and if self-government was necessary to sustain slavery, then they were happy to believe in that too. The document mentions slaves or slavery more than a dozen times, and the key statement of grievances is quite unambiguous:
"We affirm that these ends for which this Government was instituted have been defeated, and the Government itself has been made destructive of them by the action of the non-slaveholding States. Those States have assume the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions; and have denied the rights of property established in fifteen of the States and recognized by the Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted open establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is to disturb the peace and to eloign the property of the citizens of other States. They have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and pictures to servile insurrection. "And what prompted secession right then? Here, too, the document is clear: the fact that a man had been elected "whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery" and that in March 1861, his party would come into office, with as one of its goals "a war... against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States." Not a war against self-government, not a war against state rights, but a war against slavery.
Is it too much to ask that the NYT offer some factual evidence, rather than just competing opinions?
Monday, November 29, 2010
However, these are not "lessons from Haiti's disaster"; they are insights that have been around in the aid community for quite a while. At best the Haiti case illustrates their enduring validity. More importantly, building on these insights is not nearly as easy as Farmer implies.
Unfortunately, successfully building government capacity is very difficult. So is offering decent healthcare to all, as Farmer himself knows better than anyone (he created Partners in Health in 1987, in part to sustain his work with a healthcare project in Cange, Haiti). Creating a widespread public works program or a universal-access education system are not trivial either.
Farmer's appeal ought to be read not as lessons to be applied to the next 'disaster', but rather as a call for continued aid to Haiti even after the immediate post-quake emergency has passed. As one of the poorest countries on earth, there is a fair amount of "low-hanging fruit" in Haiti in terms of development initiatives that offer excellent bang for the buck. Taking advantages of these opportunities now can mean that the next disaster in Haiti will be far less devastating.
It is worth noting that not the entire microfinance sector of India is in crisis. About 10 days ago, the Times of India reported on the awarding of the "prestigious Microfinance India Award 2010" to the Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project (SKDRDP). This organization is apparently well-known for its low interest rates, which are comparable to commercial bank rates. It is also quite good on transparency: annual reports for 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 are easily found online.
Sunday, November 28, 2010
Wielding a little power is a dangerous thing, as I mentioned in an earlier post on the DMV. It should not be a surprise that the TSA is similarly vulnerable to the temptation to abuse its own power, as is shown in this striking video of TSA agents in Phoenix (mis-)handling a woman's request that her breastmilk not be X-rayed. Even when the TSA simply implements its own rules, ludicrous situations ensue, such as the random selection of toddlers for more detailed screening. James Fallows has several good posts on this here, here and here (with internal links to several others).
The bigger issue, of course, is whether any of these policies actually increase safety and, if they do (which remains unclear), whether the marginal increase in safety is worth the marginal cost of the safety measures. In other words: how much do the added safety measures cost, and how many lives do they save? (a related musing on this by Sam Savage here).
The TSA's annual budget is about $7 billion, but there are additional costs in terms of the time lost going through the ever more invasive process, which are much harder to estimate. (Interestingly, in a New York Times debate on the issue of body scanners a few days ago, only one contributor, Bruce Schneier, even hinted at the cost-benefit question.)
Over at Salon.com, Patrick Smith, on his "Ask the Pilot" blog, offers some valuable context, noting that "Deadly terrorism existed before 9/11," and that, moreover, we reacted to it in much saner ways in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Jeffrey Goldberg already argued 2 years ago in the Atlantic monthly that "Airport security in America is a sham — 'security theater' designed to make travelers feel better and catch stupid terrorists." Of course, there are plenty of stupid terrorists around, so security measures that catch only stupid terrorists are not worthless. But are they really worth as much as they cost? At this point, I suspect that the resources allocated to catching stupid would-be terrorists could be used more productively to try to catch smart and stupid terrorists alike.
Friday, November 26, 2010
In the early 1990s, post-Communist East European governments deliberated on whether old security archives ought to be opened, and what punishment ought to be meted out to functionaries in the old regimes. Only a few years later, South Africa created its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, inspired by Desmond Tutu's fervent belief in the possibility of finding out the truth and achieving reconciliation regarding the crimes of apartheid. Around the same time, the wars in the former Yugoslavia led to the rebirth of Nuremberg-style tribunals: first the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, then a tribunal for the genocide in Rwanda, and finally the International Criminal Court.
One of the intriguing features of transitional justice is the pervasiveness of "gut instincts" and assumptions with virtually no empirical verification (David Mendeloff published an excellent paper on this issue in 2004 [gated]). Just a few examples:
• Finding out the truth promotes (or is even a prerequisite for) reconciliation
(How do we know? What if it reopens old wounds and a desire for vengeance?)
• Prosecuting former high-ranking officials will lead to political instability
(Why? Maybe even their alleged political allies will be happy to see them removed from the scene)
• International tribunals are less likely to be biased than national tribunals
(Why? Bias probably depends more on how the tribunal is set up than on who pays the bills)
The literature has concentrated on countries subject to serious political instability, but of course the same issues arise in stable political systems as well. A striking example is Obama's handling of the Bush administration's torture of alleged terrorist suspects. Obama's position, announced most clearly in a television interview with George Stephanopoulos in January 2009 (transcript here), is that "we need to look forward as opposed to looking backwards"
The result, as we know, is that Obama has quite systematically avoided holding anyone in the Bush administration accountable for the torture policies. This raises the obvious question: Based on what assumptions did Obama think this was the right approach to take?
The Stephanopoulos interview suggests three key assumptions:
1. "When it comes to national security," it is necessary to make a choice between "getting things right in the future" and "looking at what we got wrong in the past" — they cannot be pursued at the same time.
2. If CIA employees feel as though they need to look over their shoulders and look for legal protection in deciding how "to keep Americans safe", their effectiveness will be reduced.
3. Not pursuing past injustice has no bearing on (or implications for) the future pursuit of justice. In other words, impunity and lack of accountability at the highest level are not a problem.
To my knowledge, we have no empirical evidence that any of those 3 assumptions are justified, and in fact there is reason to doubt that any are. Perhaps in an unstable political context, with tenuous rule of law and not much state capacity, the first assumption might be reasonable. But in the United States? That does not suggest much faith in the capacity of the American government. Indeed, as David Cole points out in a recent New York Review of Books blog post, the United Kingdom and Canada seem to be able to pursue both goals at the same time just fine, without overtaxing their system.
On the second assumption, there is no evidence that the CIA has been able to do its job better since being allowed to torture, nor does it appear to have been difficult prior to the Bush administration to place legal limits on what the CIA was allowed to do with (and to) suspects.
On the third assumption, finally, Cole notes that "the fact that we tortured and did nothing about it will periodically raise its head—in a failed prosecution, a foreign court judgment, or a terrorist incident inspired by images from Abu Ghraib."
It is often noted that Obama is more inclined to reflect and weigh options prior to making policy decisions than was his predecessor. It is disappointing, therefore, that on this crucial issue his decision seems to have been based on the kind of unexamined "gut instincts" Bush has become notorious for (and, according to his memoirs, quite proud of).
Wednesday, November 24, 2010
Hylton points out, for example, that Holder has decided (or agreed) 1) not to prosecute those responsible for torture he earlier characterized as "inherently un-American", 2) to absolve those who authorized that torture (despite an official finding of professional misconduct), 3) not to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in a civilian court, 4) to ban a number of key Guantanamo journalists from attending Omar Khadr's trial at Guantanamo, and 5) to justify the administration's right to assassinate a U.S. citizen — all for political, not legal, reasons.
A true test of the rule of law is whether authorities uphold it even when it is inconvenient, or its implications undesirable. On that count, both Holder and his boss — who, it bears recalling, taught courses on constitutional law at the University of Chicago — have been measured and found wanting.
Tuesday, November 23, 2010
The complaints against the EU expressed by John Hinderaker (to whom Bosco is responding) are: it undermines national democracies, it is more left-wing than its citizens would prefer, and most euro-zone citizens don't want the euro. Since the first two points are highly debatable, and the third is empirically false, a response is hardly necessary, but Bosco's general defense of European integration — and public support for it — is straightforward and well-taken.
Monday, November 22, 2010
Free-market capitalism, Douthat argues, means that "debt and ruin always shadow prosperity and growth." Secularism breeds "decadence as well as liberation." One might think that debt, decadence and ruin represent a sufficient characterization of Ireland's current troubles. But no, "utopians of European integration... should learn the hardest lessons from the Irish story."
What are those lessons? First, "that the E.U. was expanded too hastily." Really? Which expansion are we talking about here? Certainly not Ireland's, a member since 1973. But what recent members have been so badly affected by Ireland's crisis that they would have been better off not joining? Douthat doesn't say.
The second lesson is that "a single currency couldn't accommodate such a wide diversity of nations." This is a plausible claim, and has been made by many others. (Actually, Douthat mis-specifies it: it is not the diversity of nations, but the diversity of economies that matters.) Still, I fail to see how this is a lesson that follows from Ireland's economic crisis. One might argue that crisis recovery in Ireland has been hampered by the absence of devaluation as a policy option. But the constraints imposed by eurozone membership did not cause the crisis; it is pretty clear, and Douthat acknowledges, that a massive construction boom was a key culprit instead.
It appears Douthat doesn't like the EU. That's fine, but it would help if his arguments against the organization were a little less contrived and disingenuous.
On development, as William Easterly notes, the "summit set the lowest possible expectations on development, and then heroically failed to meet them." The official declaration does promise the G20 "will take concrete actions to increase our financial and technical support, including fulfilling the Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments by advanced countries," but remains silent, of course, on what precisely those concrete actions might entail.
A more cynical but also more honest (and amusing) communiqué was offered by Derek DeCloet in Toronto's Globe and Mail. If only official communiqués could be written a little more along these lines!
Sunday, November 21, 2010
First, the data confirm that Europeans' approval of U.S. leadership jumped dramatically upon the election of Barack Obama, especially in Western Europe; the pattern is more attenuated in Eastern Europe.
Second, and more interestingly, it turns out that in almost all EU member states — the exceptions are the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany — people over 55 are less likely to approve of U.S. leadership than are those between 15 and 30. This is surprising, as one might expect that older Europeans would view the U.S. more positively, since they "are more likely to remember America’s role in defeating Nazism in the second world war, its generosity in establishing the Marshall Plan and its role in confronting the Soviet Union during the cold war."
The Gallup finding thus raises 2 questions:
1) If the above explanation is true (positive memories among those who are older), why is it that the Dutch, the Danes, and the Germans remember these things much more strongly than their neighbours?
2) Assuming that the explanation is at least partially true, what positive things associated with the United States drive younger people, on average, to be even more supportive, given that they do not have any personal memory of these things (with the possible exception of the end of the Cold War)?
Charlemagne suggests that those 55 and over may disproportionately belong to the "radical generation of 1968," which might counteract positive impressions built on Marshall Plan aid or Cold War alliances. This seems somewhat ad hoc. Moreover, I seriously doubt that the generation of 1968 was less radical in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany, which ought to be the case if 1968 radicalism is the primary driver of the observed old vs. young differences.
Given the contiguity and overall similarity of these 3 countries, I suspect that a single shared factor accounts for the Denmark-Germany-Netherlands pattern. What that factor might be, however, I don't know.
One further intriguing poll result reported by Charlemagne: Americans are far more likely to answer affirmatively the following question: "Do you have a cause in your life that you believe in so strongly that you would leave yoru friends and family or go to jail for?"
Saturday, November 20, 2010
The paper's abstract explains: "societies with a tradition of plough agriculture tend to have the belief that the natural place for women is inside the home and the natural place for men is outside the home. Looking across countries, subnational districts, ethnic groups and individuals, we identify a link between historic plough-use and a number of outcomes today, including female labor force participation, female participation in politics, female ownership of firms, the sex ratio and self-expressed attitudes about the role of women in society."
This idea goes back to Ester Boserup's Woman's Role in Economic Development (first published in 1970; republished in 2007 with an extensive introduction reflecting on Boserup's career). Easterly and Freschi point out these cultural biases do, of course, change over time; wars, in particular, can give rise to dramatic changes.
Although the overall finding is striking, the pattern Alesina et al. identify includes a fair amount of individual variation. For example, among Nordic countries, historic plough use is not found in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, whereas it is found in Denmark. Yet female labour force participation in Denmark is very high, and comparable to that in the other Nordics. Nor is it my impression that attitudes about the role of women in society are different in Denmark.
It would be interesting to examine whether perhaps Denmark was more of an outlier (among Nordics) prior to World War II, in which case the shock of war may account for the change to a more Nordic pattern in Denmark. I suspect, however, that this is a case where shared culture trumps non-shared agricultural history.
Friday, November 19, 2010
European Union member states (both eurozone members and the United Kingdom) are less reluctant about bailing out Ireland than they were about Greece, for the very good reason that Ireland's government finances were, until the crisis, transparent and under control. The obvious downside of a bailout is that Ireland will have to accept certain conditions and will not be able to fully control its own actions. This appears to be why the Irish government has — at considerable cost — tried to hold off on asking for any international assistance.
In contrast, the EU (and especially the eurozone members) have almost been pushing Ireland to accept a bailout, due to fears of a financial crisis domino effect, with Portugal, Spain, or even Italy feared to be next. Given the scale and severity of the crisis, it now appears likely that some kind of bailout agreement will be reached. It would be nice if some of the "taking blame" on the part of creditors that Frieden calls for meant that the conditions associated with the bailout will be comparatively generous.
Be that as it may, Banville's lament makes clear that plenty of blame lies with the Irish themselves. Indeed, the folly that lead to the crisis is engagingly recounted in Fintan O'Toole's Ship of Fools: How Stupidity and Corruption Sank the Celtic Tiger. (It was reviewed in the New York Review of Books earlier this month; full article gated. O'Toole's writing about Ireland is always interesting; his The Lie of the Land: Irish Identities is also quite good.) One clear strength of Ireland so far is that its willingness to face up to the crisis and to take painful political and economic steps to address it have been far more sane than some of the folly that continues to be on display in that regard on the continent and in the United States.
Thursday, November 18, 2010
Looking through these various examples illustrates both the promise and the challenges of this approach. The two election applications got too few hits to be particularly useful, whereas plenty of people contributed information to the LA and DC set-ups. To work well, Ushahidi requires a well-connected (by internet or mobile phone) target population, with the will and desire to provide useful information, and a receiving organization that can filter the incoming information to weed out false or misleading inputs.
This suggests that, while Ushahidi can play an invaluable role in bringing together information providers and information recipients more cheaply and efficiently, the key challenge to making Ushahidi work is not the platform itself, but rather the people on either end. And that, of course, is not new. Still, Ushahidi has been hailed as portending a revolution in the management of humanitarian and development assistance by several observers.
For example, the intriguing new book Macrowikinomics, by Tapscott and Williams, opens with a story about Ushahidi's value in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake. The authors argue that "the wiki world revolutionizes the work of humanitarians, journalists, and soldiers who provide aid and assistance in some of the most unforgiving circumstances available." (quotation from an online source; I have not yet seen the book.) It is, however, perhaps better to say that it "could revolutionize the work," if only people can be found who are willing to dedicate large amounts of time to it. And there's the rub.
Tom Slee has a thoughtful and much longer blog post on the issue here, with some valuable quotations from a range of experts in IT and development. His conclusion: "the closer you look at examples of Internet-based collaboration, the more they look like a new medium for realizing old (and often admirable) commitments. There is no paradigmatic shift separating Oxfam and Ushahidi."
Supporters of microcredit operations often don't realize that most microcredit loans carry interest rates that by Western standards seem quite high. One Indian bank representative notes in the NYT article that "his company had reduced its interest rate by six percentage points, to 24 percent, in the past several years as volume had brought down expenses." The article suggests that such a rate is actually quite low, compared to rates charged by microfinance companies in other countries.
(In fact, Kiva, the excellent microcredit organization that accepts micro-donations from donors everywhere and channels them through existing microfinance organizations in the developing world, has faced some complaints in the past because many donors, who see their contribution as a form of charity, are under the impression that loans are either interest-free or very low-interest.)
Comparatively high interest rates are probably unavoidable, in that microcredit loans almost inevitably involve more overhead per dollar lent than do large loans. It is also worth noting that India's inflation rate is fairly high (currently around 10%, but as high as 16% earlier this year), so the real interest rate is much lower. Nevertheless, the accumulating interest can cause trouble for borrowers, as the NYT article illustrates.
Given how successful microfinance has been, it is hardly surprising that less scrupulous financial institutions have entered the field. Nor is it surprising that some borrowers borrow irresponsibly, if given the chance to do so. The real danger, highlighted in the NYT article, is that the resulting problems will undermine the entire microfinance industry.
Wednesday, November 17, 2010
As Easterly and Freschi note, the HRW report convincingly establishes that (officials in) Ethiopia's government, headed by Meles Zenawi, frequently uses aid as a political weapon against dissent. Given that Ethiopia's foreign aid receipts are higher than those of almost all other developing countries, this is a serious problem. Moreover, a key challenge in addressing it is that the standard tactic — bypassing the government and delivering aid at the village level — is unavailable, since the ruling political party controls village-level authorities as well.
Still, the HRW report focuses on government-run programs. So one alternative would be to funnel aid through local non-governmental organizations. It is not possible to tell from the HRW report how feasible this is, but a look at the AidData database suggests that it would be difficult: a lot of aid would need to be re-oriented.
Searching the database for aid projects in Ethiopia in the past few years, and then sorting by declining project size shows — not surprisingly — that all of the largest projects take place in conjunction with the official authorities:
HRW focuses on two programs that each appear among the top 10 largest projects: the Protection of Basic Services program ($180mn from the World Bank's IDA in 2007, $150mn from the EU in 2007, and $140mn from the African Development Fund in 2008), and the Productive Safety Nets Program ($145mn from the World Bank's IDA). The other top projects, including road transport, food security, and industrial developments, all involve government authorities as well.
The prominence of the World Bank in this list underscores Easterly and Freschi's criticism of the World Bank's "hollow" resolution to channel aid past the national government in order to prevent "political capture". They are right to conclude that the current situation is unacceptable.
As one might expect, some donor agencies take issue with HRW's findings. The multilateral Development Assistance Group Ethiopia, which includes most of the largest donors to Ethiopia, issued a rebuttal, claiming that they have not found "evidence of systematic or widespread distortion." Note how carefully this is phrased: the implication is that there was quite a bit of "distortion," only it was not extensive enough to qualify as systematic or widespread. Perhaps so, but that is still pretty problematic.
DAG Ethiopia suggests that "a greater focus on... transparency and independent monitoring" can solve the problem. Easterly and Freschi seem inclined to be skeptical. Given the lack of donor reaction to similar past reports or to the fraudulent election in May 2010, I think they are probably right.
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
What is funny about this claim is that Grant seems to think that monetary systems are to be judged for how they treat money ("[money] went where it was treated well"), rather than how they treat the people who use that money. And the key problem with the gold standard is that it is not so great for the average citizen.
The gold standard forces the money supply to expand at the same rate as the gold supply in a country, which is a rate determined both by the total world supply of gold and by the demand for gold in other countries (either for their own gold standard, or for other uses such as jewelry).
Meanwhile, economic production expands at a rate that is largely independent of the changing gold supply.
This means, almost inevitably, that there will be periods of deflation. Now deflation is not a big problem for the owners of capital (i.e. the wealthy, such as James Grant), but it is rather unpleasant for those who have any form of debt (i.e. most Americans). Indeed, the deflation induced by adherence to a gold standard was the single most salient political issue in the 1896 U.S. presidential elections, and produced what has been called "the most famous speech in American political history": William Jennings Bryan's "Cross of Gold" Speech (link includes audio recording of Bryan reading the speech).
Grant disingenuously cobbles together some random anecdotes and factoids to suggest that a reintroduction of the gold standard would be a good idea today. I do not know why the NYT deigned to publish his piece, but I think the concluding paragraph of Bryan's speech is a fitting rejoinder:
"If they dare to come out in the open field and defend the gold standard as a good thing, we shall fight them to the uttermost, having behind us the producing masses of the nation and the world. Having behind us the commercial interests and the laboring interests and all the toiling masses, we shall answer their demands for a gold standard by saying to them, you shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns. You shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold."
One amusing part of the article is a reference to the United Nations' take on the Dutch situation:
"In the spring, the United Nations, suspicious that there was something keeping women from full-time jobs, launched an inquiry to see whether the Netherlands was in compliance with the women's rights treaty."
This sentence is funny for two reasons. First, the notion that Dutch women are insufficiently organized and influential politically to undertake such an inquiry themselves, should they deem it necessary, strikes me as laughable; the UN's funds are limited enough — this is not where it should spend them. But second, Olien completely misrepresents how the UN process works.
Countries that have ratified the UN's Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), must submit progress reports once very four years to a UN Committee that monitors compliance. (This process is very similar to the one that brought the UN review of the human rights policies of the United States earlier this month, as described in a post 10 days ago). Past progress reports are available at the UN's CEDAW website (through 2007) and at the website of the UN's Human Rights office (from 2008 forward).
As a party to CEDAW, the Netherlands submitted such a report (its fifth since joining CEDAWin 1991) in February 2010. Reviewed along with the Netherlands were seven other countries, including Egypt, Panama, and Uzbekistan. The Committee's "Concluding Observations" can be found at the UN's excellent documents website, under identifier CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/5. Most of these observations are standard boilerplate, apart from some justified (and, to me, entertaining) criticism of the political party SGP. The discussion of employment and economic empowerment comes in paragraphs 36-39, with the concerns that Olien refers appearing at the end of paragraph 36: "the Committee expresses concern that the Government of the Netherlands overestimates the degree to which part-time employment is the result of women's choice." They offer no evidence for this alleged overestimation, however.
Somehow, all of this does not strike me as adding up to the UN launching an inquiry, as Olien claims it did. [By the way, the Dutch government offers some additional information in a May 2010 memo to the United Nations, noting, among others, that "in 2007 only 45 per cent of the female population aged 15 to 64 earned enough to support themselves, compared to 70 per
cent of the male population" (p. 8). Olien erroneously reports a figure of 25 percent.]
Perhaps the most interesting question raised by Olien's article (and by the Booth & van Ours paper that Olien cites) is the following: Is a gender gap that is largely a result of choice, as seems to be the case in the Netherlands, nevertheless a problem? In other words, should the Dutch government work to convince Dutch women that they should want both more full-time work and a less gendered household set-up? Yes, definitely, according to the UN Committee. But why? The Committee gives no real reason that I can see.
Prior to 9/11, of course, the United States strongly opposed torture, supporting the prosecution of Americans and foreigners alike who committed or ordered torture. Since 2004, the world has known that the U.S. government authorized torture, and U.S. soldiers engaged in it, but the Bush government was sufficiently ashamed to attempt to redefine torture out of existence, and then to deny that the U.S. engaged in torture. And now, it is not only common knowledge, but Bush feels (apparently correctly) that he can boast about it in print and on television. Impunity wins the day, sadly.
Monday, November 15, 2010
In the follow-up to the initial story, it has become clear that no historians reviewed the textbook before it was distributed. According to Sieff, the problem was first discovered by William & Mary's own Carol Sheriff, a professor history. The textbook's author, meanwhile, has admitted to relying primarily on the internet in doing her "research." Apparently, she has much to learn about the reliability of internet sources .
The Virginia Gazette has an informative interview with prof. Sheriff, discussing the error of the textbook claim. Next, for reasons that are not entirely clear, George Mason professor of economics Walter Williams decided to wade into the fray, and in the process demonstrated why one should be wary not only of internet sources, but also of the "evidence" put forward by people with an axe to grind.
In a syndicated column titled "Virginia's Black Confederates," Williams first cannily reduces the textbook claim to "blacks fought on the side of the Confederacy," which is of course not controversial at all. The controversy is over the "thousands" and over those two Stonewall Jackson battalions.
Be that as it may, Williams next claims to examine accepted scholarship on this "controversial" fact. Here is Williams's "accepted scholarship":
In April 1861, a Petersburg, Va., newspaper proposed "three cheers for the patriotic free Negroes of Lynchburg" after 70 blacks offered "to act in whatever capacity may be assigned to them" in defense of Virginia. Ex-slave Frederick Douglass observed, "There are at the present moment, many colored men in the Confederate Army doing duty not only as cooks, servants and laborers, but as real soldiers, having muskets on their shoulders and bullets in their pockets, ready to shoot down ... and do all that soldiers may do to destroy the Federal government."
Charles H. Wesley, a distinguished black historian who lived from 1891 to 1987, wrote "The Employment of Negroes as Soldiers in the Confederate Army," in the Journal of Negro History (1919). He says, "Seventy free blacks enlisted in the Confederate Army in Lynchburg, Virginia. Sixteen companies (1,600) of free men of color marched through Augusta, Georgia on their way to fight in Virginia."
Wesley cites Horace Greeley's "American Conflict" (1866) saying, "For more than two years, Negroes had been extensively employed in belligerent operations by the Confederacy. They had been embodied and drilled as rebel soldiers and had paraded with white troops at a time when this would not have been tolerated in the armies of the Union."
Wesley goes on to say, "An observer in Charleston at the outbreak of the war noted the preparation for war, and called particular attention to the thousand Negroes who, so far from inclining to insurrections, were grinning from ear to ear at the prospect of shooting the Yankees."
This discussion appears to be drawing on 4 sources, representing "accepted scholarship": Frederick Douglass, the Petersburg, VA newspaper, the Wesley article, and Horace Greeley. As we shall see, however, the last 3 "sources" really turn out to be just a single source: Charles Wesley's "The Employment of Negroes as Soldiers in the Confederate Army," published in the Journal of Negro History in 1919. Let's take each piece of "evidence", briefly, in turn.
The statement by Douglass was made in the service of calling upon the Union to draft African American soldiers. It is from "Fighting Rebels with Only One Hand", published in September 1861. The goal of the piece was not to establish evidence, but rather to convince a recalcitrant Union to broaden its recruitment. Moreover, Williams' quote is disingenuous. Douglass' statement does not begin "there are at the present moment...", but rather "It is now pretty well established, that there are at the present moment..." which gives a better sense of the indirect and second-hand nature of Douglass' claim.
Next, the apparently primary source material: the Petersburg, VA newspaper. In fact, it seems unlikely that Williams saw the paper himself. His information appears to be drawn from Wesley, who in turn draws from Greeley, so Williams' information is tertiary at best. Greeley mentions the article immediately after describing the Confederate Congress passing a bill limiting the ability of individual towns to pass laws drafting local free blacks. Here's Greeley's description: "The Lynchburg Republican (Va). had, so early as April, chronicled the volunteered enrollment of 70 of the free negroes of that place, to fight in defense of their State." (Greeley, vol. 2, p. 522).
First, note that these men were volunteered, which is very much different from volunteering. Second, neither Greeley nor Wesley says these volunteered men said they would "act in whatever capacity may be assigned to them." It is possible Williams draws this from the original source, but I highly doubt it. In fact, Wesley describes a desperation act passed in March 1865 by the Confederate Congress drafting slaves "to perform military service in whatever capacity he [the President] may direct" (p. 251), and it appears likely this is where Williams got his language.
On to the next claim. Williams says that Wesley writes: "Seventy free blacks enlisted in the Confederate Army in Lynchburg, Virginia. Sixteen companies (1,600) of free men of color marched through Augusta, Georgia on their way to fight in Virginia." This is a manufactured quotation. In fact, Wesley writes only that a paper in Lynchburg, VA (i.e. the "source" already mentioned by Williams) commented "on the enlistment of 70 free Negroes to fight for the defense of the State." Here too, note that Wesley, in contrast to Williams, does not argue that these men enlisted on their own; he notes simply that the enlistment took place, voluntary or not.
The second sentence is also made up by Williams, although his creative rewrite does not diverge much from Wesley's description (p.245). However, Wesley claims to be drawing this information from Greeley, even though Greeley offers no such information. In fact, Wesley appears to have derived his data from Christian Fleetwood's "The Negro as Soldier" (1895) which states: "the 'Charleston Mercury' records the passing through Augusta of sixteen well-drilled companies and one Negro company from Nashville, Tenn." Note that there is nothing here about these 16 companies being colored. So Wesley's footnote is wrong and his interpretation of Fleetwood's sentence is wrong; on top of this Williams manufactures a quotation out of Wesley's somewhat longer description. Not exactly quality "research" on anyone's part.
In sum, Williams' definition of "accepted scholarship" appears to be "an article from 1919 that I happened to find online and which I will creatively quote from without doing any further investigation". The irony of all this is that it is not actually controversial that there were some black Confederate soldiers, which appears to be the thing Williams is so desperate to "prove." Moreover, given the reams of research on the Civil War that have been produced since 1919, it is odd that he is not apparently aware of any. One hopes that his teaching of economics (his academic home department) does not present "accepted scholarship" from 1919 as cutting edge!
Sorry for the long rant. Lesson for the day: the internet puts many research resources at your fingertips. Use them wisely and use them well: don't trust just any information you find, and do double-check the sources used by those whose information appears reliable. There is a depressing amount of intellectually dishonest "information", even from sources that may appear reliable (Williams is "John M. Olin Distinguished Professor of Economics" at George Mason University). Other information is simply wrong due to sloppy research (as in Wesley's interpretation of Fleetwood's report).
Second, lesson, for my students only: I will check some of your sources, and even your sources' sources. And if I find errors, whether deliberate (dishonesty) or sloppy (laziness), I will get grumpy. Doing good research is important; learning to do it well will stand you in good stead throughout your careers.
Thursday, November 11, 2010
Sadly, the same desire to ignore the spirit of democracy is now on display in Alaska, where Joe Miller is fighting Lisa Murkowski's write-in bid. As William Yardley reports on the NYT's "The Caucus" blog, lawyers working on behalf of the Republican Senate candidate were challenging any write-in vote that was even slightly mis-spelled. Indeed, they were initially challenging even people who had written "Murkowski, Lisa" rather than "Lisa Murkowski".
The Republican Party lawyers base their appeals on Alaska's election statutes, which state (in paragraph 11) that "A vote for a write-in candidate... shall be counted if the oval is filled in for that candidate and if the name, as it appears on the write-in declaration of candidacy, of the candidate or the last name of the candidate is written in the space provided."
(In fact, paragraphs 9-11 all deal with write-in candidates, and each of them is written quite poorly. One would think that some clarity would be helpful in voting laws. In any case, it is worth noting that the last clause of paragraph 11 does not state that a correctly spelled first name must accompany the last name, nor does it contain the "as it appears in the write-in declaration" of the preceding clause. Paragraph 10 does not contain that clause either, for that matter.)
I am sure more quibbling by lawyers is to follow, but the deeper question is this: does Joe Miller really want to win the Senate position based on the "appearance of electoral legitimacy" that might be achieved by systematically challenging every write-in vote that does not spell Lisa Murkowski's first and last name correctly, and in that order? Would that not suggest that he, and the Republican Party hacks who are doing the challenging for him, do not, in fact believe in the spirit of democracy (or, perhaps, believe in it only for non-allied foreign countries)?
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
Of course money alone will not fix these problems, nor will simply hiring more public employees. Still, stories like this cast a disturbing light on the current debate about allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire for the richest x% of the U.S. population. Why is empathy in such short supply?
Tuesday, November 9, 2010
Last month, Nicaraguan troops "invaded" Costa Rica, blaming the "error" on a mistake in Google maps, which misplaced a section of the border by about 1.5 miles. Of course, this is highly unlikely to cause an actual war (note how the newspaper article is filed under "Notas Secundarias" :-). Still, Google is embarrassed, especially since it appears Microsoft's Bing mapped the border correctly. Google offers some defense of its error here, blaming the U.S. Department of State.
More detail about the 19th-century border dispute that lies at the source of the "misunderstanding" is offered by Stefan Geens on Ogle Earth. As Geens points out, Nicaragua's government was already trying to assert its claim to the small area under dispute when it appears to have noticed that, fortuitously, Google maps awarded them the area. This was deemed sufficient justification to go ahead and occupy it.
It is unclear whether the Nicaraguans actually believed that the appeal to Google maps would convince anyone of the legality of their actions. Nevertheless, these events make clear not only how important maps are, but also how much governments have to come rely on private organizations who have no legal responsibility under national or international law to supply correct information. It's surprising that hackers haven't jumped on this earlier — imagine the uproar if Google maps suddenly started showing Texas as an independent country, for example :-)
* Mark Monmonier is speaking at William & Mary at 4pm this Friday, Nov. 12. His talk's title will be “Fear and Loathing in Geopolitics: Cartographies of Pretension and Persuasion.” He may well have more to say on this same issue.
Monday, November 8, 2010
What is quite puzzling, however, as others have noted, is that Zoellick calls for "employing gold as an international reference point of market expectations about inflation, deflation and future currency values" i.e. some form of modified gold standard. Brad DeLong, calling Zoellick a candidate for the "Stupidest Man Alive Crown" points out that he is quite mistaken about the current role of gold (Zoellick argues that in some vague way it already serves as a currency).
Equally odd, however, is Zoellick description of the current "monetary system". He calls the current situation "Bretton Woods II", and says that it was "launched in 1971." Somehow, I doubt most people would consider the unilateral, last-resort policy option of suspending the dollar's gold convertibility by Richard Nixon equivalent to the "launch" of an "international monetary system".
Not only that, it is not a puzzle why the original Bretton Woods system, which really was a system, fell apart: the successful operation of a monetary system requires a monetary base whose supply increases apace with economic growth, and in which people have confidence. Gold by itself cannot meet those conditions. The Bretton Woods combination of gold plus dollars did so only temporarily. I don't see how anyone could expect more success for a combination of gold plus multiple currencies (which would have to maintain fixed parities relative to one another and to gold, if gold is to have any function in the system other than the speculative hedge function it has today).
The final oddity about Zoellick's op-ed is that Martin Wolf, in his blog at the very same newspaper, the Financial Times, had given a quite thorough run-down of the issues that make a return to the gold standard today utterly infeasible. Even if Zoellick does not read the FT's blogs himself, you'd think that someone either on his staff or at the FT would have warned him that not only was he being foolish, but Wolf had pre-emptively pointed out just how foolish.
Sunday, November 7, 2010
Meanwhile, Myanmar's brutal and illegitimate regime still enjoys unanimous international recognition, of course. In contrast, Somaliland, which is not officially recognized by any nation, held elections this past summer that were considered relatively fair, in which the opposition leader won, and which resulted in a peaceful transition in July. The international community continues to hope that some day Somalia will once again become a unified and peaceful nation. But in the meantime Somaliland has been de facto independent for nearly 20 years. At some point one has to wonder what purpose is served by refusing to officially recognize such a state. Numerous countries provide development assistance to the Somaliland government, but so far there is little evidence that they are considering recognizing it.
Gettleman recounted a visit to Somalia last Spring in which it became clear that a local pirate leader had no need to hide his occupation — in fact, he was a celebrity. As Gettleman noted, "There's no doubt that in Somalia, crime pays — it's about the only industry that does." It is even possible to invest in piracy ventures, just as in Europe several centuries ago, where successful pirates were often underwritten by early 'venture capitalists' who preferred to stay on land.
Gettleman also points out that this form of marine lawlessness may be particularly visible, but that for years before the pirates took to their coastal seas, foreign trawlers had been using "dirty fishing tactics, like dynamiting reefs or employing giant, waterborne vacuums... decimating not just that year's catch but future generations as well." At times these ships used to shoot at local fishermen. Today, some ships dump toxic waste in the local seas, safe in the knowledge that no Somali government will track them down and punish them.
All of this points to the difficulty of establishing the rule of law on the open seas, an issue that also goes back centuries. Grotius famously wrote De Mare Liberum, while on the payroll of the Dutch East India Company, to argue that no authority could deny anyone the right to freely use the seas. The current interpretation of "mare liberum" is that any nation can assert jurisdiction over issues of piracy, under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.
So far, no national government appears to be sufficiently concerned to do much about Somali piracy (or about other widespread forms of law-breaking such as illegal fishing techniques or dumping waste). One clue as to the reason why is that Gettleman estimates that pirates have taken in "at least $100 million" in the past few years. That is less than some annual incomes on Wall Street!
Friday, November 5, 2010
As the Washington Post reports, the delegations of several other states camped out overnight to be first in line to criticize U.S. policies. Among these were representatives of Cuba, Iran, and North Korea. The hearing today was based on a report submitted by the Obama administration back in August.
As one might expect, a good deal of the criticism focused on detention policies and torture allegations in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. As one might expect, too, much of the criticism was also rather self-serving and disingenuous. As Germany's envoy, Konrad Scharinger archly noted (quoted in the Washington Post article): "We have noted with interest that some of states which are on the first places of today's speakers list had spared no effort to be the first to speak on the U.S. We would hope that those states will show the same level of commitment when it comes to improving their human rights record at home."
Inevitable politicking aside, the UN's universal review is a valuable initiative, in that it forces all states, including Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, to give an official account of their policies. And however much they will deny, dissemble, and distort their own policies, they will nevertheless produce a public document to which they can be held accountable. As Daniel Thomas shows in the wonderful The Helsinki Effect, such small beginnings may pay unexpectedly large dividends down the line for oppressed groups in such countries.
Thursday, November 4, 2010
The article offers a nice overview of the considerable sums that even the worst autocrats continue to receive, and of what Easterly nicely calls the "Gerund Defense": the argument that autocrats are "democratizing" and hence deserve continued aid.
It's a good article overall, and well worth reading. Still, it won't come as a surprise to those who've read Easterly's other work that he is a little too facile in his criticism of donor aid agencies. Specifically, he overlooks two key points:
1. Most aid does not flow to developing country governments in the form of a blank check. Easterly is, of course, correct in noting that aid often "increases the slush funds available to the government." After all, money is fungible. But this conclusion applies only if aid is given to pay for things the government would otherwise have spent its own money on. Aid that is given to strengthen political opposition parties, for example, quite clearly does not increase the slush funds available to the government.
2. Easterly writes as though he believes that countries governed by autocrats should not receive any aid. But really that is only a defensible argument if one thinks either that a) countries have the government they deserve, so it is all right to punish people for the autocrat they have ended up with, or b) it is utterly impossible to do any good for development, and for people at the grass-roots level in countries that are governed by bad autocrats.
Consider, for example, Zaire under Mobutu. Clearly, Mobutu did not care a whit about his own people. As a result, he was not going to spend any money on, say, mosquito nets. We know, however that widely distributing mosquito nets can dramatically reduce the incidence of malaria, which is surely a good thing both in an immediate human rights sense and in terms of the longer-term development of the country.
It is quite plausible that Mobutu would have been perfectly willing to allow an NGO to come in and distribute mosquito nets to all of his citizens. Almost certainly, he would have found a way to extract money from the NGO, so the mosquito nets would have been needlessly expensive to distribute, and Mobutu would have enriched himself further. Nevertheless, I would support a national donor agency's decision to fund such an NGO. Easterly not only implies that he would not, but also that such an aid project would be a bad, paternalistic idea.